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their prospects now that they have achieved independence? What kind of political order is emerging and how will it be led?
This paper offers an analysis of the political leadership of Timor-Leste and argues that a fault line divides the most significant political actors, a division that is now formalized by the Constitution. Timor-Leste has a parliamentary system with an elected president. In practice, a semi-presidential system has emerged with two power centers: the presidency and the government located in the parliament. The president and the prime minister can each claim a decisive popular mandate. President Xanana Gusmão, as an independent candidate, won office on April 14, 2002, with over 82% of the vote. Dr. Marṍ Alkatiri, as the leader of Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) won 55 of the 88 seats in the Constituent Assembly in the elections of August 30, 2001 (the Assembly became the national parliament on May 20, 2002). Gusmão, the former resistance leader, and Alkatiri, the former activist in exile, both make claim to nationalist and revolutionary legitimacy.
A dual leadership system is potentially destabilizing for a new state. To function, the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between president and prime minister requires a collaborative arrangement between the two. 1 In Timor-Leste, the individuals occupying these two critical leadership positions are political opponents, perhaps even political enemies. The evidence of friction appeared early: only weeks after parliament was installed, the president publicly chastised it in an address to the nation in which he gave members of parliament six months to prove they could behave responsibly or he would call them to account before the people.
The differences between Gusmão and Alkatiri go back to a crisis in the resistance movement in the 1980s. The origins of this falling out will be explained below. It will be argued that because of the long-standing antagonism between the two leaders, the semi-presidential system creates a rivalry within the national leadership that could frustrate the attempt to establish an effective and, at the same time, democratic state in East Timor. As the government grapples with the challenge to combine disciplined governance with democratic principles, the prime minister's priority is to centralize state power under his party's control; the president's priority is democratic accountability in a pluralist party system.
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The Extent of the Political Challenge Before looking at the political leadership itself, it is necessary to appreciate the extent of the task that the leadership faces. The challenge is enormous: everything is urgent. Issues range from finding the money to pay civil service salaries to major, long-term policy questions such as designing a viable development strategy and working out a modus vivendi with Indonesia.
The destruction of 1999 was systematic and thorough. East Timor was left lacking basic human and material resources, dependent entirely upon foreign aid. An estimated 75% of the entire population was displaced during the militia-inflicted violence following the August 30, 1999, vote for independence. Over 70% of private homes, public buildings, and essential utilities were destroyed. More than 200,000 people, a quarter to a third of the population, were relocated by the Indonesian military into Indonesian West Timor. The new state must be built from the ground up. A report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released on May 20, 2002, predicted at least three lean years after independence, before gas and oil revenues begin to become significant. 2 Unemployment in the capital, Dili, is around 70%. With 50% of the population below 20 years of age, the pressure for jobs is unrelenting, with around 20,000 young people joining the current labor force of just over 300,000 each year. Organized gangs of unemployed youths have become an urban problem.
The trauma of the 1999 violence has not been worked through. A number of the militia members involved in the massacres of September 1999 have returned from West Timor, but the process of reconciliation is faltering after the United Nations failed to institute an effective judicial process to bring the perpetrators of the worst violence to justice. The unresolved position of prointegrationist Timorese in an independent East Timor is destabilizing. There are claims that some militia elements have actually reorganized themselves under the cover of forming a "veterans" association, misrepresenting themselves as former pro-independence fighters. 3 More destabilizing are the associations of disbanded veterans of Falintil (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste, Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor). Unemployed, angry with a government that they believe has failed to reward them, former guerrillas have been mobilized by political interests opposed to the government. A special report by the secretary-general of the United Nations Security Council noted the deterioration of internal security by late 2002. In response to "several violent incidents, such as the destructive riot in Dili on 4 December and evidence of a rise in armed groups in rural areas," the Council adopted the report's proposals for greater support for the Timorese police and strengthening the U.N. Mission's operational capacity to deal with the threat posed by armed groups. 4 To compound its domestic problems, Timor-Leste occupies a vulnerable geopolitical position, surrounded by the former occupying power, Indonesia. The district of Oecussi is an enclave, isolated in Indonesian West Timor, a hostage territory if relations sour with Indonesia. The new state's vulnerability was crassly demonstrated when six Indonesian gunboats were assigned to patrol off Dili's coastline on the eve of the independence ceremony. 5 The ASPI report bleakly warns, "East Timor could become a failed state." 6 Certainly, it has begun life, given the destruction of 1999, as a weak state, even as the report warns, a "mendicant state." Weak states can prevail, and in East Timor's case, there are some positive indicators for its political development. The new state currently enjoys considerable international support, expressed through development aid and an international peacekeeping presence. The Roman Catholic Church, whose clergy identified with the independence struggle, contributes to social cohesion and provides support for civil society through its social services and pastoral work. The people generally display a stoic social discipline and appear to have survived the violence of Indonesian occupation surprisingly intact. Mostly subsistence agriculturalists, the rural population may have rather modest expectations of the new state. In time, oil and gas revenues will start to underwrite state expenditures.
Nevertheless, on balance, the East Timorese will need to be exceptionally lucky to avoid a period of political turbulence in the months and years ahead. As Jamie Mackie has observed, if East Timor even comes close to reconciling the divergent objectives of achieving disciplined governance and democratic practice, it will be almost the only country in Southeast Asia to do so. 7 The rioting in Dili on December 4, 2002, following a public attack against the government by President Gusmão, suggests that the new state is already facing serious instability. Gusmão formally left Fretilin in 1987 and from that time has refused to accept that the party has a privileged status above other political organizations. Alkatiri, while formally accepting multiparty democracy, believes that the party he co-founded has been from its "founding moment" in 1974 the true representative of the Timorese people and their quest for social justice. In practice, the Fretilin view fits within a dominant party system where opposition parties compete for power in regular elections, but a single major party retains government. It is doubtful that the Fretilin leadership could ever accept as legitimate a government formed by their political opponents on the right.
It is striking how the key political players who survived 1975 have returned to dominate the political landscape of independent East Timor. Gusmão, José Ramos Horta, Alkatiri, Rogério Lobato, then all in Fretilin, are key players today. Their opponents in 1975, notably Mário and João Carrascalão, founders of the União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union, UDT), are their opponents now. Respected journalist and Timor specialist Jill Jolliffe has observed the shared background of these leaders:
The curriculum vitae of many of the leaders of UDT and Fretilin is strikingly similar: from the family of a liurai [chief], primary school education at the Jesuit college at Soibada, higher education in the seminary at Dare, on completion of which they generally entered the Portuguese civil service. . . . The children of Portuguese deportados were a second source of leadership, Horta and the Carrascalãos being the most obvious example. 8 Although the son of a Timorese father and a Timorese mother, Gusmão grew up in an assimilado family (assimilados were indigenous Timorese who had mastered Portuguese, paid tax, were baptized, had Portuguese citizenship, and were eligible to receive a Portuguese education). 9 He, too, studied at the Jesuit seminary in Dare before working in the colonial civil administration.
Alkatiri, descended from a south Yemeni family settled in Timor, as a practicing Muslim stood out from the mostly Catholic and mostly Portuguese mestiço (mixed-ethnicity) leaders of Fretilin. He completed primary and high school in Dili and later moved to Angola, where he graduated as a surveyor at the Angolan School of Geography. Upon his return to Dili he worked in the Public Works Department as a Chartered Surveyor. 10 Alkatiri's Portuguese education gave him entry to the small Portuguese-speaking urban elite. He became politically active as early as 1970, when he began to question Portuguese control of the territory. He gravitated to the radical politics reaching Dili from the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa and from radicals in Portugal itself. In the early 1970s, as a student in Angola, he made contact with the radical Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA).
Alkatiri was a founder member of the Associação Social Democrata Timorense (Social Democratic Timorese Association, ASDT) and its successor Fretilin, founded in September 1974. Fretilin was influenced by the ex- DENNIS SHOESMITH 237 ample of successful liberation movements in Portuguese Africa, particularly by the martyred Amṍlcar Cabral's Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde) in Guinea-Bissau. Samora Machel's Frente de Libertação de Mocambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, Frelimo) provided the working model for Fretilin. 11 Some of the left faction in the Fretilin Central Committee also found inspiration in the Vietnamese revolution and in Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution in China. Alkatiri was linked to a nationalist-Marxist group whose program was articulated by Vicente Sa'he and Mau Lear (António Carvarinho). Armed with the credibility of his firsthand knowledge of radical nationalism in Mozambique and Angola, Alkatiri was able to help mediate nationalist-Marxist policies into the Fretilin platform. 12 Allegations of communism in Fretilin were used as propaganda by the Indonesians to justify their invasion in 1975. James Dunn, a firsthand observer in 1974-75 when Australian consul in Portuguese Timor, judges communist influence in Fretilin at that time as negligible. Observers sympathetic to the independence struggle have been careful to point out that in 1975, even the Marxist minority in Fretilin were nationalists first. The front was an inclusive coalition of conservative, moderate, and radical nationalists. 13 Fretilin's president, Xavier do Amaral, and vice-president, Nicolau Lobato, were not aligned with the left. However, the Marxists, although a minority and positioned in the second echelon of the party leadership, were disproportionately influential in the decision-making machinery. The Marxist faction led by Roque Rodrigues and António Carvarinho persuaded the moderate leadership to adopt revolutionary armed struggle and a radical land reform program. 14 Alkatiri was a successful international advocate of Fretilin's cause. He came to know Samora Machel, the leader of Frelimo. He had already made contact with the more doctrinaire MPLA in Angola. He was invited by Presi- dent Machel to attend Mozambique's Independence Day celebrations in 1975. As Fretilin's national political commissioner, he toured Africa gathering from 26 states pledges of "certain recognition" if Fretilin declared independence from Portugal. On his return to Dili, he was sworn in as minister of state for political affairs in the Cabinet appointed on December 1. He now occupied the third position in Fretilin, behind Xavier do Amaral and Nicolau Lobato. His rise in the party made Alkatiri the most influential spokesman for the left-wing factions in Fretilin. 15 Jolliffe described Alkatiri at that time as "a reasonable and competent politician with an intelligent grasp of foreign affairs." Nonetheless a confidential report, made in October 1975 by a senior Australian foreign affairs officer, advanced another view: " [t] here are several extreme left ideologues in and around the Central Committee, the most important of whom is Alkatiri." 16 On December 3 that year, Alkatiri, Ramos Horta, and Rogério Tiago Lobato left East Timor as the result of a Cabinet decision to seek international support for the new republic. Alkatiri and Lobato were to proceed to Mozambique. It was the beginning of a 24-year exile. On December 7, Indonesia invaded Dili. Mozambique, which had achieved independence from Portugal on June 25 that year, recognized the Timorese republic. It accredited Alkatiri as head of Fretilin's mission and offered him safe haven. To support himself, he completed a law degree and worked for 10 years as a lecturer in international law at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. In 1977, he was appointed by the government in exile as minister for external relations. He married Marina Ribeiro, also a Timorese, and raised three children. Lobato had a more disorderly career in Africa: in 1983 he was convicted of diamond smuggling in Angola and jailed for several years.
Mauberism and Marxism
In these early years, nationalist, social democratic, and Marxist views within Fretilin were all accommodated within Mauberism, an ideology created for the party by José Ramos Horta. The term mau bere, "my brother," was a local Mambai greeting that the Portuguese appropriated and used to denigrate Timorese as backward and primitive people from the interior. 17 I began therefore to concoct our own version of social democracy by coining the word Mauberism-from Maubere, a common name among the Mambai people that had become a derogatory expression meaning poor, ignorant. Though vaguely defined without any serious theoretical basis, Maubere and Mauberism proved to be the single most successful political symbol of our campaign. Within weeks, Maubere became the symbol of a cultural identity, of pride, of belonging. 18 The celebration of Maubere identity allowed Fretilin to Timorize the idea of "the people" (in a nationalist sense) and "the masses" (in a revolutionary sense). It provided the party with a radical foundation myth validating the struggle for independence and social revolution. Mauberism as an ideology established a reading of popular sovereignty that was indigenous but not traditional. It authenticated the rural villager, not the traditional rulers (the liurai) (who, in 1975, supported UDT rather than Fretilin). Translated into a radical social program, Mauberism validated fundamental economic re-construction with production, distribution and consumption cooperatives becoming the basic economic units . . . the expropriation of large landholdings, the inclusion of unused fertile land in the cooperative system, the implementation of agrarian reform and the diversification of monoculture, especially reliance on cash crops such as coffee. 19 The Fretilin program stressed self-reliance and the rapid development of Timorese participation in local decision making. The party introduced education and cultural programs, drawing on Paulo Freire's rural literacy and adult education work in Brazil.
Following the Indonesian occupation, the Central Committee moved further to the left. Mount Matebian where he became the regional guerrilla leader of the Falintil, the party's armed wing. 21 As a member of the Central Committee, Gusmão opposed the use of revolutionary violence and did not condone the terrorism against "counter-revolutionaries" that was conducted by other Falintil resistance groups in the purges of 1977. He applied himself, however, to the study of Marxism in an effort to understand the ideological shift in the party and carried around with him a copy of the Thoughts of Chairman Mao. 22 Gusmão increasingly found himself, as a Falintil commander, in opposition to the ideological extremists in the party's Central Committee. His difficulties with the Fretilin leadership increased as he assumed a leading role in the resistance. In March 1981, he was elected national political commissar, the post previously occupied by Alkatiri, and commander-in-chief of Falintil. At the same time, he was elected president of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Conselho Revolucionário da Resistência Nacional, CRRN).
By 1986, Gusmão was convinced that the resistance struggle must be broadened. He contacted the UDT leadership in Lisbon to propose that Falintil should pursue the independence struggle on behalf of all Timorese nationalist groups, not only Fretilin. Fretilin's external delegation and the exiled representatives of UDT agreed to form a coalition. On April 26, 1986, the Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance, CNRM) was formed and Gusmão became its president. CNRM attempted to bring together all East Timorese groups including UDT, the student group, Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste (National Resistance of the Students of East Timor), Renetil, as well as Fretilin. 23 The creation of CNRM advanced Gusmão's plan to remove the resistance struggle from Fretilin control. The final step was taken on December 7, 1987, the 12th anniversary of the Indonesian invasion, when Gusmão issued an address to the people of East Timor in which he attacked the Central Committee of Fretilin for committing "enormous and excessive political errors." The Central Committee, he said, had been guilty of "political infantilism" and doctrinaire Marxism. Its senseless radicalism "paid no attention to our concrete conditions and limitations. DENNIS SHOESMITH 241 us to put many compatriots on the same footing as the criminal aggressor. . . ." Falintil, he promised, would not permit the installation of a leftist regime and would be neutral, independent of Fretilin control. Its struggle was on behalf of "the interests of all the citizens and social classes in East Timor": I publicly declare my total and wholehearted rejection of those doctrines that promote suppression of democratic freedoms in East Timor; I publicly declare that the Falintil aswain [warrior] will not permit the installation of a leftist regime that not only intends to provoke internal disintegration, but also to destabilise the whole area in which East Timor is situated. 24 In December 1988, Falintil's neutrality was formalized through the Reajustamento Estrutural da Resistência (the Reorganization of the Structure of the Resistance). Ten years later, in April 1998, all the nationalist parties, including UDT, met in Portugal and agreed to join the Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense (the National Council for Timorese Resistance, CNRT). Gusmão, then in an Indonesian jail, was elected president. Fretilin comprised the largest component in the CNRT but did not regain control of Falintil. Gusmão had achieved his object: from 1987 until independence in 2002, Falintil was permanently separated from Fretilin control.
The rift opened between Gusmão and Fretilin by his decision in December 1987 to leave the party has never been repaired. By 1991, Gusmão observed that his relationship with the Fretilin Central Committee was less tense "but there are political suspicions, which are not created or wished by me." 25 Although Marxism is no longer the issue, the 1987 split continues to divide the president and the Alkatiri government today.
The Transition to Independence
When Gusmão and Alkatiri returned to East Timor, Gusmão from house arrest in Indonesia and Alkatiri from exile in Mozambique, they had been estranged for at least 12 years. Back in Dili, Gusmão said that he was "more Falintil than CNRT" 26 and he pointedly appeared before the crowds and the world media in a Falintil uniform. The animosity between Gusmão and the Fretilin secretary-general was public knowledge. Ramos Horta, who attempted to mediate between them, remarked that Gusmão had "a strong resentment and anger towards Fretilin. He saw Fretilin's campaign in the August 30, 2001, elections as reminiscent of its radicalism of the 1970s." In 24. Niner, To Resist Is to Win! p. 135. 25. Ibid., p. 149. 26. George J. Aditjondro, "Self-Determination under Globalisation: Timor Loro Sa'e's Transformation from Jakarta's Colony to a Global Capitalist Outpost," revision of a paper presented to the conference Protesting Globalisation: Prospects for Trans-National Solidarity, Sydney: University of Technology Sydney, December 10-11, 1999), p. 10.
the August campaign for the Constituent Assembly elections, Gusmão ignored Fretilin rallies, attending a rival Democratic Party rally instead. He was publicly critical of the Fretilin leaders' aggressive conduct of the campaign. He publicly rebuked Alkatiri for threatening that on the day after winning the election, Fretilin would "go out, broom in hand, or with other things, to clean our city, to clean our village, to clean our district and sub-district; to show that Fretilin has won . . . and wants to start a new life." 27 Sixteen parties contested the August elections. Alkatiri went into the campaign confident his party would win by a landslide, predicting it would attract over 80% of the vote. In the event, Fretilin won 55 of the 88 seats with just 57% of the vote, short of the two-thirds majority required to ratify the Constitution without the support of other parties. While Fretilin did pick up 12 of the 13 seats in the district contests, in the nationally contested seats its share of the vote in some districts was quite poor. Its poorest showing was in Aileu, a Falintil stronghold where Gusmão established himself on his return in 1999.
In the national parliament, Fretilin is opposed by the Partido Democrático (Democratic Party, PD), with seven seats. PD was founded by leaders of the student movement and ran against Fretilin because its supporters believed their opposition to Indonesian rule had been undervalued by the returning leaders of the generation of 1975. Fretilin's major opponent in the parliament from the right is the Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party, PSD), led by Mário Viegas Carrascalão. Mário and his brother João Carrascalão were founders of UDT, the party that Fretilin fought in the civil war in 1975. João Carrascalão was also in the parliament for a time as one of the two representatives of the UDT. Mário Carrascalão and his brothers represent not just an opposition group in parliament but a wealthy family whose business interests as much as their long-standing political ambitions make them rivals for control of the new state. 28 Alkatiri's stated commitment to multiparty, pluralist politics will be tested if the Carrascalão clan is able to mobilize significant support in advance of future elections. Fretilin is supported by the Associação Social Democrata Timorense (Social Democratic Timorese Association, ASDT), with six seats. ASDT gives Fretilin the two-third majority it needs under the Constitution to approve revisions to it (Section 95: 3 [j]), or to approve criminal proceedings against the president (Section 79: 3). The way the Constitution sets out the relative power of president and the government is discussed further below.
When he won control of the Assembly, Alkatiri said that his goal was to create a new basis of national unity: "In the past, national cohesion was built DENNIS SHOESMITH 243 upon opposition to the occupant. Today it must be built around the goal of reconciliation and social justice." He promised a formula of inclusion that was not one of "alliances between political leaders" but the selection of members of the government team according to individual merit and abilities. 29 Mário Carrascalão doubted this:
Xanana will make some concessions, but Marṍ Alkatiri will not be flexible enough, because he is looking like an authoritarian. Xanana knows the real problems of the people. Alkatiri came back after 24 years away: he knows Mozambique. 30 The test of Alkatiri's promise of inclusive democracy was the selection of the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet). Today, 10 of the 14 ministers and secretaries of state are Fretilin, the other four are independents associated with Fretilin.
The antagonism between Gusmão and Alkatiri, evident in the election campaign to the Constituent Assembly, resurfaced in the April 14, 2002, presidential elections. Fretilin encouraged Gusmão to run as a nonpartisan independent. Instead, he chose to accept the nomination of nine smaller parties, effectively accepting the endorsement of the parliamentary opposition. He promised that if elected president, he would continue to pay attention to the democratic process, to help people assimilate the values of democracy. 31 Translated, this was a promise to provide a counterbalance to Fretilin. Gusmão sees himself, as James Dunn has observed, as "more of a leader of the Timorese political community in general" than party-political, a national leader prepared to provide a counterbalance to Fretilin's current domination of the parliament. 32 Alkatiri and the Fretilin leadership refused to endorse Gusmão's campaign for president, instead giving discreet support to his sole opponent, Xavier do Amaral. Alkatiri claimed that because of his opposition to Fretilin, Gusmão could no longer claim to be a national leader, and made it clear he would not vote for Gusmão and would instead cast a blank ballot. In the event, Gusmão was elected president by an overwhelming 82.7% of the vote. In his declaration speech after the election, he promised to act as the elected president "for the whole nation, not only those who voted for me. The Constitution, designed by the Fretilin-dominated Constituent Assembly, was loosely based on the current Portuguese constitutional system. 34 Promulgated on March 22, 2002, the Constitution located executive power in the prime minister and Cabinet, and not in the presidency, reflecting Fretilin's calculation that Gusmão would win a presidential election. 35 During the election, Gusmão jokingly told the international media, "The constitution does not allow me to put my five cents in. As president I will not have many responsibilities but I can express the desperation of the people." Responding to such comments, Arlindo Marçal, the vice-president of the Constituent Assembly, explained, "The constitution provides for a semi-presidential system in which there is a balance between the powers of the organs of sovereignty. We have a different system than the USA or Indonesia. But the East Timorese president will also be powerful, and won't have just a ceremonial function." 36 As Dunn has noted, whatever the constitutional limitations, Gusmão's personal authority makes the presidency a force in national politics. 37 Indeed, the Constitution provides the president with more than symbolic powers. The president is head of state and "the symbol and guarantor of national independence and unity of the State and of the smooth functioning of the democratic institutions." He is supreme commander of the Defense Force. His five-year term of office coincides with that of the parliament. The president has some apparent powers: to veto any statute (for up to 90 days after its passage in the parliament), to request the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of government rules, and to submit relevant issues to a referendum. The president can also convene extraordinary sessions of the national parliament and dissolve the parliament in case of a serious institutional crisis preventing the formation of a government or the approval of the State Budget (Section 86:
). For its part, a two-thirds majority of the parliament can initiate criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court against a president. 
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Within weeks of independence, the president formally castigated the government. In an address to the nation, Gusmão condemned members of parliament as "enormously irresponsible" for failing to attend sessions regularly and lacking dedication. He said, "We should give it, in the first place, six months-enough time for all of us to know whether our government is or is not doing something to benefit our country." 38 He noted that in two recent sessions, members of parliament (MPs) had not attained a quorum to approve legislation. He warned MPs that if they did not mend their ways, "[T]hey will create the legitimate impression that parliament needs better-qualified people, more capable of responding to political demands." He also attacked the Fretilin-drafted Constitution for providing inadequate protection for a free media. The speech, putting the government on notice so early in its term, demonstrated that Gusmão did not intend to be simply a ceremonial head of state. Alkatiri refused to respond in kind to the criticisms, putting the attack down to Gusmão's style: "He likes to administer shock therapy, to wake people up, but we don't need a wake-up call. I don't see it as a declaration of war. He did say people should give us more time, after all. Let him talk." 39 Gusmão can appeal to a strong popular expectation that government must be democratic and clean, as well as effective. 40 Fretilin, for its part, will find it difficult to live with the commitment to inclusive and democratic multiparty politics. In the first place, as the government of a new state, Fretilin's leadership is determined to establish its right to authoritatively make and enforce the rules. This involves a struggle for state policy to prevail over opposition and autonomous social organizations. In the second place, Fretilin denies the legitimacy of its parliamentary opponents on the right, whom Fretilin regards as collaborators and landlords. Outside the parliament, the party is challenged by an extremist breakaway group, the Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor Leste (Popular Council for the Defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, CPD-RDTL) and disaffected Falintil veterans. CPD-RDTL was established in 1999 and identifies itself with the original independent republic proclaimed on November 28, 1975. It claims to be the "real" Fretilin. It staged a rival independence rally on November 28, 2002, that attracted 3,000 supporters, humiliating the prime minister at the official ceremony where only some 300 people attended. Provoked by such opposition, the temptation will be for Fretilin to repeat the history of other post-revolution liberation movements and attempt to install a de facto one-party system.
The Army and the Police
The government must look to its security agencies to support its authority. There are early signs that this support may not be forthcoming. By late 2001, the United Nations Transitional Administration was aware that the division between followers of Gusmão and the Alkatiri government was widening and a potentially dangerous power struggle was under way. The new national army was caught up in this struggle.
Falintil presents a major problem for the Alkatiri government. The preamble in the Constitution celebrates the "historical struggle carried out by the glorious forces for national liberation" and, understandably, many Falintil veterans now feel they have earned a privileged place in independent East Timor. Their reintegration into civilian life, however, is difficult. Falintil veterans were provided some financial support by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) through its Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), funded by the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), but this support ended in December 2001. 41 In September 2000, the East Timor Transitional Cabinet made a critical decision to adopt the recommendations presented as "Option Three" by an independent study team from the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. The option was to establish over three years the East Timor Defense Force (ETDF, or its Portuguese acronym, FDTL) as a light-infantry force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 reservists. The first battalion, formed in 2001, before independence, was composed entirely of 650 Falintil veterans. The U.N. Transitional Administration agreed that the Falintil High Command would control the selection process for the first battalion. The High Command ensured that the officer corps of the FDTL was selected from those Falintil commanders loyal to Gusmão and to Falintil commander, and now commander of the FDTL, Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak. The senior commanders and most of the Falintil recruits in the first battalion were drawn from the area collectively referred to as "Firaku" in the eastern districts (with around 30% of the population). The Firaku of the eastern districts were most strongly identified with the independence movement, maintaining the armed struggle against Indonesian forces. James Fox has remarked that "Battalion I of the ETDF is preponderantly a Firaku force and this has quietly been noted as such by East Timorese in western districts [collectively known as DENNIS SHOESMITH 247 'Kaladi']." 42 The Kaladi make up some 50% of the population. The FirakuKaladi ethnic divide is a potential fault-line in East Timorese politics. 43 The core of the new defense force is identified, then, not only with the president and commander-in-chief, rather than the government, but with one ethnic collectivity rather than another. This has provoked protests and allegations of political favoritism in the new force.
From its inception, it was clear that the FDTL was not to be a neutral professional force under civilian control. At a speech marking the simultaneous demobilization of Falintil and the establishment of the FDTL, BrigadierGeneral Ruak reminded the government that the recruitment for the first FDTL contingent exclusively from within Falintil ranks guaranteed "the continuity of the spirit of Falintil, the legacy of its history, its symbolism and its bond with the People of East Timor. . . . I affirm once again: there will be no destabilising campaign that will annul the institution that is Falintil and its identity. . . . 44 The political character of the army has grave implications for the Alkatiri government. The first battalion was established before the independent government was in place and able to influence the character of the new force. Now formally designated the Falintil-FDTL (F-FDTL), the army is effectively controlled by Gusmão loyalists, officers selected as senior commanders in what one Western security analyst called "a political demobilization" through which "Xanana's friends got in and his enemies were left out. It's a politicized military. They are very much Xanana's boys." 45 Once he had assumed command, Ruak was able to limit recruitment to the second battalion to 18-to 21-year-olds with a high school education. This effectively excluded from the national army those Falintil veterans who had not been recruited into the first battalion and whose loyalty to Ruak and Gusmão was questionable. The young recruits in the second battalion are reportedly loyal to their commander-in-chief and to their supreme commander. Whether they are loyal to the government is untested. administration. Martins works alongside the United Nations Police (UN-POL) commissioner, Peter Miller, representing the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). Martins has a reputation for professionalism. He is said to have stood up to Lobato to counter attempts to politicize police recruitment. In September, Lobato drew up a list of some 500 resistance veterans (presumably from his and Gama's veterans association) for recruitment to the National Police. He publicly called for former guerrillas to be appointed rather than police officers who had served under the former Indonesian administration. 54 Martins defended the recruitment policy based on qualifications and education.
Attacks against the police became a major national security issue in late November 2002. On November 25, a mob including angry unemployed veterans attacked the Baucau police headquarters. They were protesting their exclusion from recruitment into the police service. The building was ransacked and several vehicles were damaged. One protester was killed and several others were wounded. Lobato's dealings with disaffected veterans provoked Gusmão to demand his removal from office. In his independence anniversary speech on November 28, Gusmão went much further in his public attack against Fretilin than he had in June. After again berating parliamentarians, "many of whom are constantly absent," he ridiculed Fretilin and its manipulation of "independence" to care for its cadres. He underlined the growing security problem:
November 28th 2002, is celebrated, with a feeling of grief because of the problems in Uatu-Lari, the problems in Dili, the problems in Ualili and Baucau, the problems in Same and Ainaro, the problems in Ermera and Liquiça and the problems in Suai and Maliana. Unfortunately, it seems that by creating problems, one can rise to become a Minister, and these same people, after becoming Ministers, only know how to increase existing problems. . . . I seize this opportunity to demand of the Government to dismiss the Minister for Internal Administration, Mr. Rogério Lobato, on the grounds of incompetence and neglect.
The Parliament Speaker, Francisco Guterres, denounced this demand as dictatorial, and Alkatiri announced that his rejection of the demand was "absolute." 55 and their determination to impose a Portuguese-style culture on the government and administration of the new state. 58 
Conclusion
In assessing the potential for trouble for the new state of Timor-Leste, the temptation is to highlight the risks and dangers rather than the less-dramatic positive factors. This sort of analysis runs the danger of accumulating negative evidence until a worst-case scenario appears inevitable. Mindful of this caution, it does appear, nevertheless, that the political divisions examined in this paper are real and will need to be addressed if the leadership of the new state is to establish order, effective government, and multiparty democracy. The fault line established by a semi-presidential system complicates the already formidable task of establishing an effective and at the same time democratic system of governance. A presidential system probably would have been a more coherent system for a new state lacking an established set of governing institutions. That the Fretilin leadership rejected a presidential model reflected not only their familiarity with the Portuguese mixed model but almost certainly their recognition of the risk that Gusmão would capture the presidency and leave Fretilin excluded from power. Deep antagonisms at the highest level of the national leadership seem to be encouraging a polarization of political alliances that could threaten the new state's viability. The disturbing events of November-December 2002 appear to confirm a pessimistic prognosis for the new state. If Timor-Leste is to overcome these challenges, the relationship between Prime Minister Alkatiri and President Gusmão over the coming months will be critical. Will they put aside their long-standing differences in the interests of national stability, or will the president use the gathering unrest to increase his pressure on the Fretilin government in the hope of replacing it? The prime minister, for his part, will need to discipline his cabinet and, in particular, his minister for internal administration as a necessary condition for his government to regain control of the security situation. In terms of both democratic development and disciplined governance, the central issue between the two leaders remains the position that Fretilin should occupy in the new state: as an equal member of a competitive multiparty democracy or as the party with an exclusive historic right to govern. The resolution of this issue is at the center of Timorese politics now, as it was in 1975. 
